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Abstract 
 
Globally, much biodiversity is found on private land. Acting to conserve such biodiversity thus 
requires the design of policies which influence the decision-making of farmers and foresters. In this 
paper, we outline the economic characteristics of this problem, before reviewing a number of policy 
options such as conservation auctions and conservation easements. We then discuss a number of 
policy design problems, such as need for spatial coordination and the choice between paying for 
outcomes rather than actions, before summarizing what the evidence and theory developed to date 
tells us about those aspects of biodiversity policy design which need careful attention from policy 
makers and environmental regulators.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
  
Much biodiversity is found on privately-owned land. For example, in the UK, agricultural land 
provides important habitats for a wide range of birds and insects (UK NEA, 2011). In the US, 
privately-owned lands contain at least one population of two-thirds of all species listed as being 
federally endangered (Groves et al. 2000); Privately-owned forest land in Finland and Poland contains 
many Natura 2000 sites, a designation which is indicative of high conservation values (Watzold et al, 
2010).  
 
The way in which private lands are managed therefore has major implications for biodiversity. In 
Australia, conservation of many endangered native species depends on changing the behavior of 
private farmland owners (Reeson et al, 2011), whilst plant species richness in privately-owned 
Austrian haymeadows has been shown to decline with increasing agricultural intensity (Zeckmeister 
et al, 2003).  Changes in how agricultural land is managed have had significant impacts historically on 
a range of biodiversity indicators in the UK (Hanley et al, 2009), with the 20th century in particular 
being associated with declines of many species groups on farmland (Wilson et al, 2009). Agricultural 
land management continues to impact biodiversity. For example, according to the UK National 
Ecosystem Assessment “...recent evidence suggests that about 67% of 333 farmland species 
(broadleaved plants, butterflies, bumblebees, birds and mammals) were threatened by agricultural 
intensification in the year 2000” (UK NEA 2011, p65). Globally, habitat destruction and degradation 
associated with conversion to agricultural land and intensification of agricultural land practises are 
leading drivers of losses of biodiversity and ecosystem services (MEA 2005).  
 
These trends of biodiversity loss impose costs on society, since biodiversity plays a key role in 
sustaining the functioning of ecosystems, and thus in the provision of ecosystem services (Rafaelli, 
2006), whilst individuals have been shown in many studies to be willing to pay for biodiversity 
conservation (Kontoleon, Pascual and Swanson, 2008). Yet the supply of biodiversity typically goes 
un-rewarded by market forces due to missing markets: private landowners usually receive no direct 
financial reward for enhancing or protecting biodiversity, due to the non-rivalness and non-
excludability of these benefits (Hanley, Shogren and White, 2006). Indeed, protecting biodiversity 
typically comes at an opportunity cost to landowners, for example if it requires foregoing profitable 
land conversion or intensification.  The market thus generates too little biodiversity conservation 
effort, and too much biodiversity loss. For this reason, government intervention to promote 
biodiversity conservation on private land is warranted. Due to political reluctance to force landowners 
to produce more biodiversity, and practical issues with extending the planning system to agricultural 
and forest land management, governments in many countries have introduced a range of schemes 
whereby landowners and managers can voluntarily opt to take up contracts for changing how they 
manage land in return for payments. In agriculture, such schemes are known as “Agri-Environment 
Schemes”, or AES. Spending on AES has been rising as a fraction of total public spending on 
agriculture, for example in the EU and the US. The EU spends on average USD$7.2 billion per year 
on payments to incentivise farmers to enhance environmental benefits, including biodiversity, and 
avoid using environmentally detrimental production techniques (Cooper et al. 2009). Within the UK, 
the largest AES has funding of around £400 million per year over the period 2007-2013 (Dunn, 2011). 
The largest scheme in the US, the Conservation Reserve Program, spends USD$1.7 billion per year 
(USDA 2010). 
 
Our focus here is on the design of such agri-environment schemes. To illustrate, we draw on examples 
drawn Europe, Australia and the US. However, it is also important to recognize that AES provide a 
useful template for informing the design of Payments for Ecosystem Service (PES) programs more 
broadly and many of the issues that we discuss have parallels in debates about designing PES 
programs in many other countries (Jack et al. 2008; Quintero et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2010; 
Somerville et al. 2010). 
 
Economic, socio-demographic and geographical factors impact participation in AES. Lynch and 
Lovell (2003) examine participation decisions in Maryland. They find that factors such as farm size 
and income, the types of crops grown and whether the children in a family are expected to keep 
farming when grown up have a positive impact on uptake of AES. Defrancesco et al. (2008) present 
an econometric analysis of the factors affecting AES participation in Italy. They identify ease of 
adaptation, adequate financial compensation, positive attitudes of neighbouring farmers as well as 
attitudes towards environmental conservation as increasing participation. Similar results have been 
found by Langpap (2004) for AES programmes in Oregon and Washington in the US.  
 
In this paper, we first of all review the economic characteristics of the “biodiversity policy design 
problem”, before moving to consider a range of policy options, and a series of policy design 
challenges.. We close by offering a classification system by which most policy options for 
biodiversity conservation on private land can be described in terms of their most important features 
from an economics viewpoint. 
 
2. THE ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE “BIODIVERSITY PROBLEM” 
Landowners often face a cost in taking actions intended to produce biodiversity. This cost can be 
expected to vary, both across landowners, and for any landowner according to the “amount” of 
biodiversity she/he aims to “produce” (Armsworth et al. 2012, Box 1).  Variation in this supply price 
across landowners comes from variations in opportunity costs, which may be due in turn to 
differences in land productivity, differences in production opportunities, differences in resources and 
differences in skills. For example, Hanley et al (1998) found that the opportunity cost for farmers in 
the Shetland Isles of reducing grazing intensity to improve the ecological quality of moorland varied 
from £5.70 to £21.87 per sheep removed from grazing moorlands. AES schemes in which payment 
rates do not vary across landowners will over-compensate all but the marginal farmer if the 
opportunity costs of taking actions intended to produce a given level of biodiversity improvement 
differ across farmers. A cost-effective distribution of biodiversity supply effort will involve either the 
targeting of actions on low opportunity cost sites (Ando et al, 1998), or the use of economic incentives 
which encourage low-cost suppliers to offer to supply biodiversity outputs, rather than high cost 
suppliers (Connor et al, 2008) .  
For a particular landowner, the marginal cost of taking actions intended to produce biodiversity may 
also be increasing. For example, a farmer will give up the least productive land first for a subsidised 
wetlands re-creation scheme, before giving up more productive land. The same principle applies to 
choices individuals will make over the enterprise mix on the farm – lower cost changes that are 
compatible with biodiversity improvements will be made first.  
Another relevant feature of the problem is that the marginal benefits of actions in terms of biodiversity 
“produced” may also vary across landowners and respond in nonlinear ways to the actions of 
individual farmers. For example, assume that the action needed to increase abundance of a particular 
bird species is to reduce livestock grazing intensity, and that this is costly for the farmer. A given 
reduction in grazing intensity can produce varying responses in terms of bird abundance for reasons to 
do with the characteristics of an individual site (eg its soil type, altitude, or exposure), the 
characteristics of neighbouring areas (eg the presence of woodland within 100 metres), and current 
grazing intensities already present on the site (Dallimer et al, 2009). For species protection 
programmes, actions by a given landowner, for example in refraining from felling of old growth 
forest, may have marginal pay-offs in terms of species recovery which vary with distance to the 
nearest existing population of the species. This implies that an efficient policy design would have 
incentives which vary across space, since the biodiversity pay-off per euro also varies; and/or that the 
awarding of conservation contracts would partly depend on spatially-varying ecological benefit 
functions (conservation metrics), such as are used in Australia for scoring bids (Oliver et al, 2005; 
Reeson et al, 2011).  
A third feature of the biodiversity problem with economic importance is that of hidden information. 
This is of two types. First, a regulator will typically be unsure about the cost type of individual 
landowners, in terms of their true marginal supply prices for biodiversity. We have already argued that 
variations in these supply prices across agents is to be expected. But this information is hard for the 
government to observe, since it depends on a wide range of landowner and land characteristics, and 
since there are typically a large number of farmers/landowners who are involved in the supply of 
biodiversity. Farmers will have private information on these supply prices – whether they are “high 
cost” or “low cost” type. Farmers also have local knowledge of their land which means they may have 
more information than the regulator on the likely ecological outcomes of certain actions – for 
instance, if they know of the existence of bird populations on their land of which the regulator is 
unaware. Second, AES schemes often involve land managers undertaking “actions” which are hard for 
the government to monitor accurately. For example, if increasing populations of the Bush Stone-
curlew in Australia requires farmers to engage in predator control, such actions are very hard (and 
costly) for the agency paying for these actions by way of conservation contracts to monitor. The level 
of effort which farmers engage in to fulfil the terms of their contracts is not known to the regulator 
with any precision.  If this is so, then given that effort is costly to the farmer, farmers have an 
incentive to shirk and not undertake the actions for which they are being paid. This in turn means that 
the expected biodiversity benefits are not forthcoming.  
Box 1: Estimating the supply price of biodiversity improvements 
Armsworth et al. (2012) attempt to estimate farmer's supply curves for different biodiversity outputs to 
overcome the hidden information problem. They surveyed 44 extensive grazing farms in the Peak 
District in England, collecting data on the enterprise mix on farms, input and output prices and current 
subsidies being received as well as on the abundance and richness of different bird species on the 
properties. The economic data on farm businesses were used used to parameterize linear 
programming (LP) models predicting the enterprise mix that would maximize farm profits for three 
representative farm types in the region. The ecological data were used to predict the likely responses 
of different biodiversity indicators (the densities of five single species of conservation concern and two 
summary indicators looking across the whole bird community) to farm management actions, by fitting 
nonlinear regressions relating bird responses to farm management practices across the sample 
farms. The authors then extended the optimization models to include nonlinear constraints requiring a 
given level of improvement in each biodiversity indicator. By tracking the decrease in maximum farm 
profit that resulted, they were able to recover estimates of the "true" supply price of a given level of 
improvement in some biodiversity indicator. An example is illustrated in the following figure 
 
FIGURE CAPTION 
Estimated reduction in maximum farm profit (GBP £1000) when requiring a given improvement in 
species richness on three representative farm types in the Peak District, UK.  
 
The results confirmed many of the policy design challenges discussed here. Opportunity costs of the 
management actions associated on average with an improvement in some biodiversity target varied 
across farms. Marginal costs of producing these conservation benefits also increased with the level of 
biodiversity improvement sought on a particular farm.  
 
Looking across the different candidate conservation targets also emphasized that the specification of 
the objective in AES was very important. The different species and whole bird community indicators 
responded in very different ways to changes to the enterprise mix, suggesting little scope for relying 
on a single "umbrella" policy target that if improved would enhance biodiversity overall. A similar 
conclusion arises when using the models to try to understand likely ecological implications of future 
scenarios of policy and pricing changes (Hanley et al. 2012). 
 
 
Hidden information on farmers’ cost type, ecological potential and hidden actions leads to problems 
of adverse selection and moral hazard, the implications of which are usually analysed within a 
Principal-Agent model (Mueller, 1989; Fraser, 2002; Ozanne and White, 2007). Anthon et al (2010) 
model the effects of these problems on the optimal design of incentive contracts for Natura 2000 
forests. In their paper, ecological benefits from landowner actions are unknown before a conservation 
contract is signed, and only revealed ex post, and vary across forests. They show that the regulator 
should optimally offer forest owners an amount greater than their true supply price in order to induce 
compliance on high ecological-potential sites. They also conclude that payments should at least partly 
be linked to observable ecological outcomes, rather than just the cost of actions. However, most AES 
schemes at present are based on actions, not outcomes. 
Box 2 – Environmental Stewardship in the UK 
Environmental Stewardship (ES) is the flagship agri-environment scheme in England. Launched in 
2005, the objectives of ES include: wildlife conservation; natural resource protection; prevention of 
erosion and water pollution; and promotion of public access to and understanding of the countryside 
(DEFRA 2005a, 2005b). ES is composed of finite length contracts in which participating landowners 
are compensated to augment their land practices to meet programme objectives. The scheme has two 
contract levels: Entry Level Stewardship (ELS) and Higher Level Stewardship (HLS). ELS is non-
targeted and all landowners who agree to a minimum level of stewardship will be accepted. Contracts 
last for 5 years and landowners receive a flat rate payment of £30 per hectare, per year for all eligible 
land irrespective of the management actions undertaken (DEFRA 2005a). The HLS, on the other 
hand, is highly targeted to deliver environmental benefits to priority areas. HLS contracts run for 10 
years with landowners receiving payments dependent upon the management actions undertaken 
(DEFRA 2005b). One interesting feature of the HLS program is that while it pays a fixed price per 
contract, farmers compete to secure these contracts by offering to undertake varying numbers of 
conservation activities. In effect, the payment per activity can vary even if the payment per contract is 
fixed. By 2011, approximately 70% of agricultural land in England was under Environmental 
Stewardship, covering 6.5 million hectares of land (Nature England, 2011). 
A final feature of the biodiversity problem which is important for economic analysis is that the 
biodiversity benefits of a particular set of actions are stochastic from the viewpoint of the individual 
farmer/forest owner, since they are only partly a function of the actions of this agent. Consider the 
case of actions designed to increase the population of a bird species that nests and breeds on farmland. 
Ecologists know that certain actions that farmers can take are likely to contribute to an increase in the 
overall population size of this species. Such actions might include predator control, creation of small 
wetlands, and appropriate grassland management. But the abundance of the species on any one farm 
will be highly variable through time and will also respond to many factors outside the farmer’s or 
regulator’s control, including for example, climatic variations, variations in the abundance of parasite 
species, variations in abundance of competing species, etc.This means that the outcome which the 
regulator cares about is only partly under the control of the agent charged with producing it. For risk 
averse agents, this means that they face a cost of risk-bearing from non-delivery of the environmental 
good. This matters if an AES is set up to pay for biodiversity outcomes rather than actions (see section 
4 below). In such circumstances, it may be necessary to offer farmers a two-part payment, one which 
depends on actions and one which depends on outcomes. In this way, the government shares the cost 
of risk-bearing. 
 
3. POLICY DESIGN OPTIONS   
Regulation 
Governments clearly have the option of compelling landowners to protect biodiversity on their land, 
for example by refraining from certain potentially damaging operations for specific sites or specific 
species. The former approach was followed in the Wildlife and Countryside Act in UK, whilst the 
latter is exemplified by the US Endangered Species Act. Two problems follow from such legislation. 
First, legislation often fails to recognise the (opportunity) costs which designation of protected species 
puts on landowners, and thus creates conflicts (Shogren et al, 1998). It also leads to incentives for 
landowners to take actions which down-grade sites so that they are de-listed, and thus controls 
removed. Thus a landowner in the US finding a federally listed species on their land has an incentive 
to destroy this species, and thus avoid the restrictions which its public discovery would place on them 
(Brown and Shogren, 1998). The US Endangered Species Act has undergone various revisions in a 
bid to address some of the incentive problems created for private landowners, through for example, 
the introduction of the “no surprises” clause in habitat conservation plans and introduction of “safe 
harbour agreements” (Bean 2000). The UK Wildlife and Countryside Act recognised that costs would 
occur as a result of restrictions of “potentially damaging operations” on Sites of Special Scientific 
Interest, and offered to pay compensation for profits foregone from such actions. But this led to an 
incentive for landowners to threaten to undertake such actions, since the only means the Nature 
Conservancy Council had of stopping them was to offer payments, leading to a problem of moral 
hazard (Spash and Simpson, 1993). 
Moreover, the extension of detailed regulatory control over the actions of private land-owners in the 
countryside with respect to agricultural and forest management has not found political favour in many 
Western countries, due to the nature of de jure and de facto property rights over rural land use. Thus, 
extensions of the planning system (for example) to cover agricultural land use are un-common1, and 
indeed might be very inefficient due to variations in supply prices for biodiversity across landowners, 
and the likely magnitude of the administration costs of enforcing such an extension of planning rules. 
 
Uniform payment schemes 
Uniform payment schemes dominate agri-environmental policy. Farmers are offered a payment for a 
set of management actions which are thought to increase biodiversity. In many cases, such payments 
are only available within certain geographic regions of a country (eg the Environmentally Sensitive 
Areas scheme in the UK that was the predecessor of the ES program described in Box 2); in others 
they are available country-wide (eg the ES program that replaced it). Uniform payments have a 
number of advantages. They are relatively simple to set up and to administer, and may be perceived as 
“fair” since every landowner is offered the same price for undertaking a given action. Uniform 
payments are more cost-effective than regulation, since only those farmers with supply price less than 
subsidy will sign up. However, such schemes ignore many of the features of “the economic problem”, 
in that they over-reward all but the marginal producer; whilst usually no recognition is made of spatial 
variation in the supply price or variation along supply curve for a given farmer. Payment rates may or 
may not recognise variations in ecological potential of sites, depending on the basis on which they are 
calculated – for example, a calculation of average opportunity costs of complying with a set of 
                                                 
1 Although aspects of farmer’s activities in UK national parks, for instance, may be regulated by planning 
procedures: the construction of new agricultural buildings, for instance. 
management measures would not reflect variations in ecological potential. An improvement would be 
to allow spatial targeting of farms where payments are to be offered which could still be combined 
with uniform payments for contracts. 
 
Box 3: Consequences of simplifying payment schemes 
 
Using the estimated supply curves discussed in Box 1, Armsworth et al. (2012) examine the 
improvements in each biodiversity target offered by different simplified payment designs. They 
compare the performance of these simplified policies to the biodiversity enhancements offered by the 
optimal policy design from the perspective of the regulator, which pays farms at their opportunity costs 
(no producer surplus) and targets contracts towards those who can supply conservation 
improvements most cost effectively. They considered different policy simplifications individually and in 
combination, including offering open enrolment and failing to target contracts towards the most cost 
effective producers; paying a fixed price for biodiversity improvements across three different regions; 
and purchasing improvements at the cost of the last and most expensive unit in each location.. All of 
these policy simplifications are common in AES policies. 
 
When acting together these different policy simplifications resulted in most of the expenditure on AES 
programs simply increasing producer surplus. The reduction in biodiversity gain offered when 
compared to the optimal policy ranged from 49-100% across seven different conservation targets. Of 
the policy simplifications examined, a failure to differentiate pricing in space was particularly 
problematic, a conclusion that was robust to idiosyncratic responses of different conservation targets 
to farm management changes and considerable uncertainty in the regressions relating bird responses 
to farm management actions. A failure to target contracts towards cost effective producers or to reflect 
changing marginal costs of producing biodiversity improvements within farms only occasionally 
yielded comparable reductions in the biodiversity gains available. 
 
Of course, AES programs that avoid such policy simplifications will likely be more expensive to 
administer. By reversing the question to ask how much a government agency would have to pay 
farmers with the optimal policy to secure the same level of improvement in some biodiversity target as 
is offered by each simplified policy, the authors sought to place an upper bound on the extra 
transaction costs it would be worth taking on to implement more complicated policies. For example, 
looking across the seven different biodiversity indicators, it would have been worth spending 70% or 
more of the funds that otherwise would have been given to farmers to discriminate pricing in space 
and to target contracts towards cost effective producers. Importantly, achieving this type of cost 
effectiveness in payment rates and contract allocations is the goal of some AES designs, like reverse 
auctions, currently being advocated in the literature. 
 Conservation Auctions 
Conservation auctions are reverse or procurement auctions, where the auctioneer - the policy maker -
procures environmental benefits like biodiversity improvements from a selected set of landowners. 
These landowners are chosen on the basis of their submitted bids which reflect their supply price. 
These bids are anchored from below by the opportunity costs of changing land use management and 
may have institutionally fixed upper limits or “bid caps”. An auction fosters competition between 
bidders to minimize the “information rents” or profits earned by landowners and maximize the 
amount of ecosystem services procured for a given budget, since lower bids have more chance of 
being accepted. Given a fixed budget for contracts, farmers have an incentive to moderate bids if they 
wish to be awarded such an agreement (Stoneham et al, 2003; Rolfe et al, 2009).  
Perhaps the most prominent conservation auction is the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) which 
was started in 1985 by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA 2011, Box 4). Under the CRP 
landowners’ bids are ranked in descending order on the basis of a benefit-cost index, termed the 
Environmental Benefit Index. The benefit element of the ratio is the ecological value of the 
environmental benefits supplied by the project and the cost is the bid submitted (monetary values for 
these benefits are not computed). Use of this benefit-cost ratio discourages landowners from marking 
up their bids too high as this reduces chances of selection. A range of auction mechanisms like the 
Bush Tender  (Stoneham et al. 2003), Catchment Care Australia (Connor et al, 2008), and the Auction 
for Landscape Recovery pilot (Gole et al. 2005) have been employed in Australia. (2010) provide 
details of a reverse auction for forest conservation in Tasmania, whilst Brown et al (2011) describe an  
auction in the Canadian Prairies linked to conservation easement payments. 
Several design options exist for conservation auctions (Latacz-Lohmann and Schillizzi, 2007). For 
example, a government needs to decide whether to use a uniform price design (all successful bidders 
receive the same payment) or a discriminating price design (successful bidders receive their bid 
price). Uniform price designs can do a better job of revealing true opportunity costs, since if the price 
is set equal to the highest losing bid, then an individual farmer’s bid only determines the chances of 
winning a contract, not the value of the contract. However, uniform price designs may deter 
participation (Brown et al, 2011).  In multi-round iterative auctions, participants can submit bids 
repeatedly in multiple rounds. In these auctions, bidders get the opportunity to revise their bids. Thus 
losing bidders have a chance of lowering their bids and getting accepted in latter rounds. Schillizzi 
and Latacz-Lohmann (2007)  Cason et al. (2003), Cason and Gangadharan (2004) and Rolfe et al. 
(2009) indicate that inter-temporal learning in general reduces the cost efficiency of the auctions 
relative to a subsidy irrespective of the ecological goal, or that there is only a very modest 
improvement of performance over time (Cason and Gangadharan 2005).   
Box 4 – the Conservation Reserve Programme 
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) is the largest land retirement programme in the USA 
(Khanna and Ando, 2009). The programme consists of 10 to 15 year contracts in which eligible 
landowners are compensated by the state for removing sensitive cropland from production. The CRP 
was established in 1985 with the initial objective of reducing rates of agricultural soil erosion but has 
since been expanded to focus additionally on wildlife conservation and water and air quality (Hansen 
and Hellerstein, 2006). In 2010, the CRP had set-aside 31.2 million acres of sensitive agricultural land 
(Hellerstein and Malcolm, 2011). The CRP operates as a discriminatory-price auction in which 
landowners submit bids to retire a proportion of their land. Studies of the program suggest that after 
the first few rounds of the auction, the regional bid cap becomes known, because landowners’ bids 
tend to the maximum value (Khanna and Ando, 2009; Shoemaker, 1989). This results in landowners 
receiving economic rents. Despite the informational problems that exist within the scheme, the CRP 
has been responsible for many environmental benefits. For example, the CRP has reduced soil erosion 
by an estimated 450 million tons per year and has increased the abundance of prairie pothole ducks by 
approximately 2 million per year (USDA FSA 2011). 
The relative effectiveness of different conservation auction designs in any context hinges on political, 
economic and ecological considerations. Connor et al (2008) note that assessments of the performance 
of auctions relative to uniform payments can be undertaken by fixing either the total cost of the 
scheme, or the environmental success (eg acres enrolled), with rather different conclusions emerging 
about comparative performance. Moreover, changes in the design of auctions could have differing 
impacts on alternative criteria of policy performance. For instance, increasing information about the 
spatial location and characteristics of other bidders might improve ecological outcomes at the expense 
of higher pay-outs to farmers (Cason et al, 2003). Finally, the design of the conservation metric with 
which bids are weighted is crucial to determining the success of auctions (Connor et al, 2008).   
 
Conservation Easements 
Conservation easements provide a popular policy option for securing conservation improvements on 
private land in many parts of the world (Environmental Law Institute 2003; Merenlender et al. 2004; 
Land Trust Alliance 2011). Easements are voluntary, market-based agreements between landowners 
and conservation agencies in which the landowner receives a direct payment and/or tax rebate in 
recompense for ceding particular land rights. However, the landowner retains overall fee title to the 
property. Some easements have been used to limit development, but many others place restrictions on 
grazing activities, timber operations, etc. Moreover, while a popular tool for land trusts and other 
nonprofits, easements are also commonly used by government agencies to secure conservation gains. 
Taken together, these aspects make easements often very comparable to AES. Unsurprisingly then, 
when designing easements, policy-makers face many of the same challenges that are present in 
designing AES. For example, hidden information about the true supply price of conservation benefits 
on a given property make it challenging for regulators to avoid overcompensating all but the marginal 
landowner (Armsworth and Sanchirico 2008). Similarly, government agencies face challenges in 
monitoring compliance with easement terms.  
One obvious difference between easements that restrict agricultural uses and timber extraction on a 
property and AES is that the exchange of property rights in an easement is commonly made “in 
perpetuity”, whereas AES typically offer fixed duration contracts. In general, the advantages and 
disadvantages of operating conservation contracts of different durations is not a well-studied area, 
something that we return to below. Also, often large numbers of AES contracts are being issued 
simultaneously in scheduled (re-)enrolment rounds. In contrast, easement transactions often occur in a 
more piecemeal fashion proceeding on a deal-by-deal basis, which limits scope for relying on 
competitive allocation mechanisms to overcome limitations of hidden information. Despite these 
differences in how the two instruments are being applied, we believe that much could be learned from 
comparative studies contrasting experiences with AES and easements. 
Creating markets for biodiversity 
One aspect of the “biodiversity problem” outlined in section 2 is that of missing markets. Since many 
of the benefits which biodiversity conservation provides are non-rival and non-excludable,  markets 
may not emerge in which buyers and sellers trade. However, government agencies sometimes enable 
such markets to form. For example, the US Fish and Wildlife Service have sometimes allowed trading 
in endangered species and their habitats under the US ESA (Bean and Dwyer 2000; Fox and Nina-
Murcia 2005) following a cap and trade type approach. Under this model, a landowner who plans to 
undertake land management actions that may harm individuals of a federally listed species is required 
to undertake compensatory mitigation to improve the plight of the species elsewhere. This could 
involve purchasing species conservation credits from a third party mitigation bank that specializes in 
creating and restoring habitat for the species on a different site. The potential economic benefits from 
such a scheme are realized through the gains from trade made possible by introducing flexibility into 
the command and control regulation. Ecological benefits could also result by allowing otherwise 
disparate conservation actions on the landscape to be aggregated in space. Also, some species require 
proactive management of habitats, such as fire management, something that can be incentivized with 
this approach but otherwise is not covered by the US ESA. As originally framed, the US ESA 
prohibited private landowners from taking certain actions that would harm listed species but did not 
require them to undertake conservation management that would aid these species. Despite the 
proposed benefits of such trading schemes, it should be emphasized that designing and implementing 
conservation banking programs in such a way that promised economic and ecological benefits are 
realized is a formidable policy challenge in its own right (Salzman and Ruhl 2000). 
 
Markets for biodiversity can also arise in the absence of a regulatory cap, for instance if private 
buyers can capture some of the benefits of conservation. Conservation organisations can offer 
conservation contracts to farmland owners, with their members benefitting from resultant 
conservation outcomes ( more birds), an example being the Ducks Unlimited Canada scheme in 
prairie habitats of Alberta, Manitoba and Saskatchewan which offers payments to farmers for 
wildfowl-friendly farming practices (Banack and Hvenegaard, 2010 . Numerous voluntary markets 
are also starting to emerge where buyers pay for the delivery of specified ecosystem services. For 
instance, water companies paying farmers to reduce run-off of water pollutants by changing how they 
manage livestock, or paying landowners for peatland restoration as a way of reducing downstream 
water treatment costs (Dunn, 2011). Such voluntary markets are much less abundant for biodiversity 
conservation, presumably because the private benefits of increases in biodiversity are lower and 
dispersed across greatly more beneficiaries than, say, the increase in profits to a single water company 
from a reduction in water treatment costs. Biodiversity improvements could be purchased by bundling 
them with water quality improvements. Government’s role in such emerging markets may be as a 
facilitator, as in the setting of codes of practice (although these can also emerge from the sector 
without intervention), and as a regulator of trades.  
 
4. POLICY DESIGN CHALLENGES 
In this section we identify some challenges for conservation policy design.  
Paying for outcomes not actions 
Since the objective of biodiversity policy is to increase the supply of biodiversity, an obvious question 
is whether payments should be targeted at outcomes (more bird species, higher species density) rather 
than at the management actions thought to lead to such outcomes. Most agri-environmental policy in 
indeed targeted at management actions, typically because these are thought to be easier to observe, 
and because the “output” of biodiversity from a given area of land is determined by a wide range of 
factors, only some of which are under the control of the landowner. This means that outcome-based 
contracts are riskier for the landowner than action-based contracts (Whitten et al, 2007). Moreover, it 
may be more expensive for the regulator to monitor conservation outcomes (eg counting birds) than 
management actions (eg whether a farmer has drained a wetland or not). However, outcome-based 
payments have other advantages (Gibbons et al. 2011). If some of the management actions which are 
crucial to achieving a biodiversity target are hidden (very expensive for the government to observe), 
then paying for outcomes may be more efficient. Moreover, landowners and managers quite likely 
hold information on the best areas of land within their properties for promoting target species 
populations, and may have alternative options for encouraging such increases in species. Outcome-
based payments encourage land managers to make use of this information to generate biodiversity 
conservation more efficiently than payment for actions.  
Whitten et al (2007) consider the case of promoting conservation of ground-nesting birds in the 
Murray Catchment in Australia. From the perspective of the regulator, enhancing populations of birds 
such as the Bush Stone-curlew and Brolga require a combination of observable actions (eg stocking 
levels) and hard-to-observe actions such as predator control and the day-to-day movement of stock. 
Moreover, landowners are likely to have private information on where on their land it is best to 
promote population increases of these birds. The authors present a theoretical model which combines 
an auctioned up-front payment for management actions with an ex post payment for conservation 
outcomes. They find that setting the outcome payment relatively high compared to the up-front 
payment is desirable, since it induces landowners with high ecological potential to enroll and to 
supply higher levels of conservation effort, although this is at the expense of fewer participants for a 
fixed budget. Whitten et al. then run a trial of the combined scheme with farmers in the area. 17 
farmers made bids for contracts, with outcome-based contracts being preferred to action-based 
contracts. The costs of securing a given area of land enrolled was lower with outcome-based contacts, 
with a cost saving of around 30%. Crucially, the researchers had developed a metric for measuring 
conservation outcomes in a relatively low cost manner. 
 
Determining contract length and other dynamic considerations 
In AES, contracts with landowners are generally finite but span a variety of durations across different 
programs (Lennox and Armsworth 2011). Perpetual easements covering agricultural land uses can to 
some degree be thought of as an extreme case. Contract duration discussions are particularly salient 
given that ecological and economic conditions relevant to AES design vary through time and future 
predictions about these conditions are subject to considerable uncertainty. 
Several theoretical studies are relevant to discussions of contract duration. Ando and Chen (2011) 
investigated the optimal length of conservation contracts in an analysis that incorporates enrolment 
and reenrolment issues.They found that while longer contracts increase conservation benefits from 
any single landowner, they lead to fewer landowners being willing to re/enrol in the programme. The 
authors also show that contracts should be longer when the ecological benefits mature slowly and that 
it may be optimal not to contract at all when uncertainty surrounds likely ecological outcomes.  
Finally, the authors show that non-ecological characteristics are also central to optimal length of a 
conservation contract; optimal contracts are longer where the turnover rate of parcels enrolled in 
conservation programs is high and where the average private land income is low. Lennox and 
Armsworth (2011) also investigated how uncertainty regarding future ecological benefits of contracts 
and regarding a landowners’ willingness to reenrol on contract completion interact to determine 
optimal contract lengths. They find that uncertainty over future re-enrolment exerts more influence on 
the optimal choice of contract duration and also emphasize conditions under which a portfolio of 
contract lengths can outperform employing uniform length contracts. Finally, in related work, Gulati 
and Vercammen (2006) examine a different dynamic aspect of conservation contracting and consider 
the potential benefits of offering time-varying payment schedules to recognize the changing incentive 
faced by landowners as a contract progresses and ecological conditions on the property improve.  
 
Spatial coordination 
Some elements of biodiversity (e.g. species with home ranges spanning multiple properties) can be 
more efficiently conserved if protection is targeted towards spatially adjacent parcels. Conservation 
agencies are thus somtimes interested in concentrating similar land uses on spatially connected parcels 
rather than dispersing them at different locations on the landscape. Conservation policies intended to 
achive this aptial coordination have focused on combining uniform subsidy payments which pay for 
the land use changes with top up with bonuses when neighboring participants have similar land uses 
or have connections between patches which contain biodiversity friendly habitats. Examples of such 
subsidies include those under the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) in the state of 
Oregon in the US and subsidies with network bonuses in Switzerland (Mann 2010). These polices 
have their economic foundations in the Agglomeration Bonus (AB) proposed by Parkhurst et al. 
(2002, 2007) and Warziniack et al. (2007) which can incentivize spatial coordination. Communication 
between neighbors can produce the ecologically desirable outcomes, but may also imply a lower level 
of cost-effectiveness.  
 
Given these issues, attention has been devoted to implement spatially connected auctions which give 
greater weight to bids which are spatially adjacent to each other. Reeson et al. (2011) and Rolfe et al. 
(2009) have experimented with such auctions, where spatial connectivity is one metric used to rank 
bids. A challenging proposition in the domain of spatial conservation auctions is to reduce intensified 
rent seeking by participants at strategic locations on the landscape. As budgets are limited, if players 
at strategic positions exploit their locational advantage and submit very high bids, then too few 
projects may be procured  and spatial patterns may not be attained at all. Thus the auction achieves 
neither economic efficiency nor ecological effectiveness.  
 
Transactions Costs 
Transaction costs faced by landowners seeking to enrol in AES has been found to deter participation. 
The transactions costs incurred by participants can be classified  into search, negotiation, 
administrative, monitoring and enforcement costs (Dahlman 1979, Hobbs 2004). Of these, search, 
negotiation and administrative costs are ex-ante costs incurred prior to participation (Mettepenningen 
et al. 2009). The magnitude of these costs can play an important role in influencing farmer 
participation. McCann and Easter (1999) and Mettepenningen et al. (2009, 2011) estimate the 
transactions costs for water pollution reducing programs in the Minnesota River in the US and for 
farmers and public agencies for AES participation in different parts of the EU. A study on AES 
participation in the EU highlights reduced participation of farmers in Sweden and Germany owing to 
such costs (Falconer 2000). Moreover complex conservation contracts with complicated ecological 
goals also increase transactions costs and discourage participation (Ollikainen et al. 2008). Ex-ante 
costs such as costs of filling up forms, going to workshops, negotiation and joint planning between 
neighbours are germane to the evaluation of the Agglomeration Bonus. Parkhurst and Shogren (2007) 
have analysed spatial coordination of neighbours as a coordination game. In their study non-
participation is a strictly dominated strategy since the payoffs from the Agglomeration Bonus scheme 
are greater than the payoffs from business as usual agricultural land use. This scenario may however 
change in the presence of transactions costs of participation. Agglomeration payoffs can be obtained if 
neighbours participate and choose the same action as the player. Yet if the transaction costs of 
participation are high enough, eligible participants may opt to not participate at all. Additionally if 
farmers reason that owing to high transactions costs, their neighbours will not participate, they may 
not participate either.  
 
5.DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The main policy attributes which are important in the design of any AES which emerge from the 
above material are summarized in Table 1. Since the government is seen as contracting with private 
landowners for the supply of environmental goods, we describe these in terms of the nature of the 
contract arrived at. These attributes are (i) the allocation mechanism – who are the potential suppliers 
of the good, and how will they be chosen (ii) contract stipulation – what is to be supplied (eg hectares 
of wetland restored; reductions in stocking rates; or an output measure like a density increase in a 
species of conservation concern); (iii) contract duration – how long is the contract for; and (iv) price – 
what payment is offered to the farmer, and how is this determined. We also highlight two possible 
responsibilities for fulfilling each of these aspects of mechanism design, according to whether 
responsibility lies with the principal – the government or its regulatory bodies, or whether it lies with 
the agents, namely the farmers or land owners. Thus in entry level Environmental Stewardship, a 
government agency sets payment levels, but the overall allocation of contracts arrived at is determined 
entirely by what farmers choose to enroll. In contrast, with a conservation auction, farmers take 
responsibility for deciding what price they will receive for their actions when formulating their bids, 
and the Principal chooses among bids to determined which of those contracts to accept. The more 
responsibility that the Principle takes on for setting these design parameters, then the greater the 
burden of information acquisition, for instance on farmers’ costs and ecological benefits, it must bear. 
This framework also highlights one obvious gap in the current panoply of program designs: namely, a 
scheme in which farmers compete in part by offering to commit to contracts of varying durations. 
Finally, we note that an important feature of all schemes is the state of knowledge about the ecological 
production function linking landowner actions to biodiversity outcomes; landowners and the 
government may know different things about such functions. 
  
Table 1 – schematic of policy design attributes and responsibility for actions  
 Principle decides Agent decides 
Allocation mechanism: who 
receives contracts 
Conservation auctions, 
targeted enrolment programs 
(higher level ES in the UK) 
Open enrolment programs 
(e.g. Entry Level ES in the 
UK) 
Contract stipulation: what 
they must provide 
Eg Nitrate Sensitive Areas in 
the UK 
Higher Level ES in the UK 
where farmers choose from 
among a menu of options 
what to offer. 
Contract duration CRP in the US, ES in the 
UK, etc. 
 
Price Entry Level ES in the UK. 
Higher Level ES pays a fixed 
price per contract but farmers 
may offer differing numbers 
of actions. 
Reverse auctions like CRP in 
the US, the BushTender 
program in Australia 
 
As is well known, government intervention in agriculture has often resulted in increases in rents for 
owners of the factor of production the supply of which is least elastic, namely land. Enrolment of land 
into conservation programs can increase both the value of farmland as well as non-enrolled farmland 
(Shoemaker 1989, Wu and Lin 2010). The rise in enrolled land values can be attributed to the land 
rents (over and above the actual value of the land) accruing to participants from participation in AES. 
Also since many of these conservation programs entail retirement of land out of crop production, a 
rise in commodity prices following reduced agricultural supply increases the values of non-enrolled 
farmland as well. Finally increased amenity benefits from enrolled lands can improve the values of 
adjoining developed parcels. Vukina and Wossink (2000) estimate the impact of the Dutch Nutrient 
Quota system and other environmental policies on land values and find them to be increasing as well. 
 
All of the policy options discussed in this paper are based on the notion that landowners are primarily 
motivated by profit maximization, and that monetary incentives are required to encourage them to 
supply costly biodiversity benefits. In a competitive industry (such as farming), where the great 
majority of producers are price-takers and sell un-differentiated products, profit maximization is the 
strategy most likely to be consistent with long-term economic viability. We thus think profit 
maximization is a reasonable assumption to make for the representative farmer. This is not to dispute 
that other motivations are important, as summarized in the recent paper by Sheeder and Lynn (2011). 
They ask whether profit maximizing is a reasonable assumption in describing the environmental 
behaviour of farmers, in deciding whether to take up AES payments. They give examples of empirical 
studies showing that the assumption is reasonable, for example for conservation auctions in Australia 
and participation in soil conservation programmes in Maryland, but also cases where the assumption 
did not predict well (eg Chouinard et al, 2008 in the Pacific NW).  We also note that several schemes 
operate on the basis that farmers can be persuaded to adopt conservation-friendly behavior if simply 
provided with information on, for instance, grassland management techniques which promote the 
survival of ground-nesting birds (Beedell and Rehman, 1999; 2000). If farmers are indeed willing to 
engage in conservation –friendly action voluntarily, then it is possible that offering monetary 
incentives may crowd out behavior which is so motivated.  
 
Another variant on the basic model of offering payments to individual farmers for conservation 
actions is to offer payments for teams or groups of land managers to sign up, which can encourage 
spatial coordination of actions as well. This approach is epitomized in the Netherlands. Policy makers 
there have developed schemes in which farmers work in collaboration with each other and with local, 
regional and national agencies. By 2004, cooperative agreements existed between 10 per cent of all 
farmers in the Netherlands, cover 40% of all agricultural land (Cooper et al. 2009). On a much smaller 
scale, the UK’s Higher Level Stewardship Scheme offers a financial incentive for group applications 
for a single management option, although up-take seems to be rather limited (Franks 2011). 
 
Moreover, the policy options considered here are frequently implemented in a very second best world. 
Agricultural activity continues to be heavily subsidized in many countries, and such subsidies have in 
the past been argued to result in an intensification of production and an expansion of the area of land 
under farming which resulted in species declines for fauna and flora (Bowers and Cheshire, 1983; see 
also references in Dallimer et al, 2009). Reducing or removing agricultural subsidies might thus result 
in an improvement in the conservation status of many farmland species, although such impacts are not 
likely to be uniform in direction or extent across species  (Hanley et al, 2012). Farming also results in 
a range of negative externalities such as non-point nutrient pollution, which can reduce aquatic 
biodiversity (Dodds et al, 209). Correcting such negative externalities should also be part of the 
portfolio of policies considered. 
 
Finally, a cost-benefit consideration of policies to promote biodiversity conservation on private land is 
also helpful in thinking about both the economic efficiency of schemes such as the Conservation 
Reserve Progamme and Environmental Stewardship Scheme, and the design of such schemes in terms 
of which aspects of biodiversity (and landscape) conservation they target. Early studies showed that, 
on the whole, the benefits of agri-environmental schemes in the UK exceeded the costs (Hanley et al, 
1999), but that taxpayers’ preferences for the design of such schemes were at odds with the 
distribution of spending (Hanley et al, 1998b).  A benefits assessment for the Environmental 
Stewardship Scheme in England in 2010 also showed benefits to exceed costs (Natural England, 
2010). Valuation studies have also focused on how the benefits of such policy interventions can be 
transferred across space (Colombo and Hanley, 2008), and on the sensitivity of benefits estimates to 
econometric procedures (Campbell et al, 2009). 
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